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THE ENACTMENT OF THE Fair Labor Standards Act(FLSA) in 1938 symbolized Congress’s recognition that em-
ployees deserve protection from being overworked and un-
derpaid.1 In spite of this clear aspiration, heated litigation over
the proper interpretation of the FLSA’s minimum wage provi-
sion has ensued for decades.2 While Congress has consistently
and meticulously amended the FLSA to increase minimum wage
compensation in accordance with prevailing socioeconomic in-
dicators,3 the appropriate method for assessing compliance with
the provision remains unclear. Confronted with lawsuits by em-
ployees claiming they were not paid the hourly wage prescribed
by the FLSA, several circuit courts have adopted the view that
employees are not necessarily entitled to any hourly wage, as
long as their average weekly wages comply with the federal stan-
dard.4 The Seventh Circuit recently followed this trend in Hirst
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.A., Political
Science, Southern Methodist University, 2018. Ashley Jo would like to thank her
friends and family, especially Kim and Alicia, for their constant support.
1 See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 491, 493 (1945) (citing Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum
Wages and Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937)).
2 See Anna P. Prakash & Brittany B. Skemp, Beyond the Minimum Wage: How the
Fair Labor Standards Act’s Broad Social and Economic Protections Support Its Application
to Workers Who Earn a Substantial Income, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 367, 375
(2015).
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HISTORY OF FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 1938–2009, https://www.dol.gov/whd/
minwage/chart.htm [https://perma.cc/DV5N-U5WJ] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
4 See, e.g., Douglas v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 875 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he Second, Fourth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have embraced the per-work-
week construction.”).
209
210 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
v. SkyWest, a class action suit in which flight attendants alleged
they were not paid in accordance with FLSA requirements.5 De-
spite being the first to analyze minimum wage requirements in
the unique context of airline wage schemes, the court dismissed
the flight attendants’ claim on grounds that the “per-workweek”
FLSA interpretation applies to all industries.6 This Casenote ar-
gues that by adopting an absolute interpretation of the FLSA’s
minimum wage provision, the Seventh Circuit overlooked an op-
portunity to carve out a specific exception for airlines that
would better serve public policy by providing a solution for com-
plex wage and hour issues plaguing the industry.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of Hirst v. SkyWest are relatively simple, despite the
complex pay scheme at the center of the dispute. Eight flight
attendants filed this case against their employer, SkyWest.7 The
defendant airline is headquartered in St. George, Utah, while
the company’s flight attendants are based out of airports in ten
different states.8 SkyWest flight attendants work long days, per-
forming a variety of tasks both on board airplanes and in air-
ports before and after flights.9 However, SkyWest only pays its
flight attendants for their time spent in the air, or “block time”
as it is known throughout the industry.10 New flight attendants
earn $17.50 per qualifying hour.11 However, because the actual
“duty day” is much longer than time spent in the air, SkyWest
flight attendants are not compensated for a portion of their
work each day.12 Plaintiff employees brought their class action
lawsuit based on this disparity.13
In March 2015, four of the plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern
District of Illinois, claiming their employer’s failure to pay them
for time on the ground constituted a violation of the FLSA and
the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.14 Several months later, a simi-
lar claim was filed by SkyWest flight attendants in the Northern
5 Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc., 910 F.3d 961, 963 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2759 (2019).
6 Id. at 965–66.







14 Id. & n.2.
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District of California, also alleging violations of the FLSA and
various state and local ordinances governing minimum wage.15
Ultimately, the two cases were consolidated and heard in the
Northern District of Illinois.16
The court decided that “in assessing violations of the federal
minimum wage, an employee’s wage is calculated as the average
hourly wage across the workweek.”17 Therefore, the flight at-
tendants failed to state a claim from the district court’s perspec-
tive because none of them were paid less than a weekly average of
$7.25 per hour.18 Consequently, the district court dismissed all
of the flight attendants’ claims with prejudice, determining that
none properly pleaded an FLSA violation.19 Additionally, the
district court denied the state and local law claims as preempted
by the Dormant Commerce Clause.20
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s
interpretation of the FLSA provision.21 However, it reversed the
district court’s holding with respect to the application of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, thus reinstating the plaintiffs’ mini-
mum wage claims under state and local laws.22 According to the
Seventh Circuit, the Dormant Commerce Clause only serves to
invalidate a state law “where there is a clear showing of discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce,” and SkyWest failed to al-
lege any sort of discrimination aside from the burden of
compliance costs associated with conflicting state minimum
wage laws.23 Without minimizing the significance of invalidating
the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause in the con-
text of the airline industry, this Casenote will concentrate on the
court’s interpretation of the relevant FLSA minimum wage
provision.
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
The provision at issue in Hirst, section 206 of the FLSA, pro-
vides that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees
who in any workweek is engaged in commerce . . . $7.25 an
15 Id. at 964.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 964–65.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 965.
21 Id. at 963.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 967.
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hour.”24 While this provision “could be construed as requiring
hour-by-hour compliance, both administrative and judicial deci-
sions established the workweek as the measuring rod for compli-
ance at a very early date.”25 In fact, the Department of Labor
issued a policy statement in 1940, just two years after the enact-
ment of the FLSA, electing the workweek as “the standard pe-
riod of time over which wages may be averaged to determine”
compliance with minimum wage laws.26 However, in issuing the
statement, the General Counsel of the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor remained mindful that the mini-
mum wage was defined as an hourly rate, specifically clarifying
that the Department’s interpretation was not binding on
courts.27
Four years after the Department of Labor’s policy statement
was issued, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
judiciary’s freedom to deviate from agency interpretations of the
FLSA in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.28 While acknowledging that ad-
ministrative interpretations “do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment,” the Skidmore Court squarely rejected
the Wage and Hour Division’s general recommendation that
“periods of inactivity are not properly counted as working
time.”29 The Court further advised that it refused to “lay down a
legal formula to resolve cases so varied in their facts as are the
many situations in which employment involves waiting time.”30
In light of the Skidmore analysis, federal courts are clearly au-
thorized to deviate from agency interpretations of the FLSA
where the specific facts of a case so require.31 In fact, this
landmark case gave rise to “Skidmore deference,” a principle of
judicial review under which agency interpretations are only af-
forded consideration to the extent they exude “power to per-
24 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018).
25 Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
26 Hirst, 910 F.3d at 965 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Re-
lease No. R–609 (Feb. 5, 1940), as reprinted in [1942] Wage & Hour Man. (BNA)
185).
27 Dove, 759 F.2d at 171–72.
28 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
29 Id. at 135, 138, 140 (adjudicating a dispute over firefighters’ pay schemes).
30 Id. at 136.
31 See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37–38 (2005) (holding that time
spent by meat processing plant employees walking between locker rooms to put
on required protective clothing constitutes paid work time under the FLSA).
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suade.”32 The Supreme Court subsequently established an
elevated standard of review under which administrative
rulemaking may be analyzed with greater deference, yet it spe-
cifically distinguished informal agency interpretations as deserving
only the less deferential Skidmore standard.33
In the half century following Skidmore, several federal appel-
late courts have examined the issue of whether the FLSA’s mini-
mum wage provision should be measured on an hour-by-hour or
average weekly basis.34 In spite of the Supreme Court’s mandate
to afford only minimal deference to agency interpretations,
every circuit court confronted with this issue has adopted the
Department of Labor’s per-workweek standard.35 However, the
Seventh Circuit became the first—and only—court to deter-
mine whether compliance with the Department’s interpretation
is appropriate in the context of the airline industry.36
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN HIRST
In Hirst v. SkyWest, both the district court and the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that under the FLSA, the average
hourly wage across the workweek—not wages per hour—is the
relevant unit for measurement.37 In reaching its decision, the
Seventh Circuit first examined the plain text of the FLSA, ex-
plicitly pointing out that “29 U.S.C. § 206 does not state what
measure should be used to determine compliance with the mini-
mum wage, nor do any of the surrounding provisions provide
guidance.”38
32 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 237–38 (2001)
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
33 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2000) (explaining that
agency policy statements are not owed the more deferential standards under
Chevron and Auer).
34 See Douglas v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 875 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir. 2017);
U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir. 1995); Hens-
ley v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 786 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1986);
Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Olson v. Superior Pontiac-
GMC, Inc., 765 F.2d 1570, 1578–79 (11th Cir. 1985); Blankenship v. Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc., 415 F.2d 1193, 1198 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Klinghof-
fer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960).
35 See Douglas, 875 F.3d at 887–88; Cole Enters., 62 F.3d at 780; Hensley, 786 F.2d
at 357; Dove, 759 F.2d at 171–72; Olson, 765 F.2d at 1578–79; Blankenship, 415 F.2d
at 1198; Klinghoffer Bros., 285 F.2d at 490.
36 Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc., 910 F.3d 961, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 2759 (2019).
37 Id. at 964–66.
38 Id. at 965.
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Given the statute’s shortcomings, the Seventh Circuit immedi-
ately turned to the Department of Labor’s 1940 policy statement
to glean an interpretation.39 Even recognizing that the policy
statement was never codified, the court rationalized its per-work-
week preference on grounds that Congress never amended the
FLSA to alter the Department’s understanding over the last
eighty years.40 Moreover, the court noted that every circuit to
assess the FLSA’s minimum wage provision has adopted the per-
workweek measure.41 Finding “no reason to deviate from the
Department’s interpretation or the consensus of other federal
appellate courts,” the Seventh Circuit ultimately adopted the
per-workweek measure as well, declining to establish or even
consider any industry-specific exceptions.42 Applying its newly
adopted workweek standard to the facts of the case, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court finding that none of the flight
attendants properly stated an FLSA claim because their wages
complied with the statutory minimum when averaged on a
weekly basis.43
V. ARGUMENT
In holding that the per-workweek standard applies to all in-
dustries governed by the FLSA minimum wage provision, the
Seventh Circuit overlooked key considerations rooted in Su-
preme Court precedent and public policy, which tend to sup-
port the application of an hour-by-hour standard of
measurement for wages in the airline industry. The Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Hirst undermines the Supreme Court’s direc-
tive to analyze cases requiring FLSA interpretations on a fact-
specific basis. FLSA litigants arguing for the position adopted in
Hirst have appealed to courts by emphasizing the judiciary’s
“preference for national uniformity” in embracing interpreta-
tions of federal law.44 However, the Seventh Circuit did not need
to deviate from the per-workweek standard adopted by other cir-
cuit courts in order to reach an opposite holding in Hirst.
Rather, the court still could have embraced the per-workweek
standard to preserve uniformity, while making an exception for




42 Id. at 966.
43 Id.
44 See Douglas v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 875 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2017).
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The Supreme Court made very clear in Skidmore that FLSA
provisions are not intended to be absolute.45 However, rather
than analyzing the unique characteristics of employment as a
flight attendant, the Seventh Circuit found “no reason to deviate
from the Department’s interpretation” given the consensus
among other federal appellate courts.46 The Seventh Circuit’s
reliance on the analyses of other circuit courts is problematic in
the sense that the duties of a flight attendant are in no way com-
parable to those of employees in other industries to which the
per-workweek measurement has been applied.
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to adopt the per-
workweek measurement in United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty
Corp., a 1960 criminal case involving allegations by security
guards who claimed they were never paid for overtime in addi-
tion to their hourly wages, though they were promised a delayed
payment as compensation.47 In perhaps a slightly more analo-
gous case, Dove v. Coupe, the D.C. Circuit applied the per-work-
week measurement in assessing the minimum wage claims of
limousine drivers.48 Ultimately, the drivers were unable to estab-
lish an FLSA minimum wage claim when they based their com-
plaint on the unpaid time they spent waiting for assignments
because they were not required to complete any work-related
tasks during the period at issue and still received a “guarantee,”
even if they were not assigned to a single route.49
Unlike the security guards and drivers in Klinghoffer and Dove,
the flight attendants in Hirst were not guaranteed pay in any
sense because SkyWest only compensated them for time in the
air.50 As established, the flight attendants earned nothing for
pre- and post-flight duties, including training, deplaning passen-
gers, waiting during gate-checked baggage delays, passing
through customs, handling mechanical issues after the final
flight of the day, writing reports, and complying with drug
tests.51 In general, accomplishing these tasks requires flight at-
tendants to begin working at least one to two hours prior to
45 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“Each case must stand
on its own facts.”).
46 Hirst, 910 F.3d at 966.
47 United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 489–90 (2d
Cir. 1960).
48 Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
49 Id. at 172–75.
50 See Hirst, 910 F.3d at 964.
51 See, e.g., id.; Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc., No. 15 C 02036, 2016 WL 2986978, at *2
(N.D. Ill. May 24, 2016) (mem. op.).
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scheduled departure, in addition to staying on duty for no less
than fifteen minutes after arrival.52 Thus, a flight attendant may
be scheduled to work thirteen hours, but must actually endure a
duty time of fourteen and a half hours.53 The Seventh Circuit
recognized the disparity between the overall workday and “block
time” in its analysis yet did not point out a key distinguishing
factor in Hirst: SkyWest flight attendants are not compensated
for their waiting time even when flights are delayed or can-
celled.54 Moreover, Federal Aviation Administration regulations
restrict the number of consecutive hours flight attendants are
allowed to work.55 This means that if a flight is cancelled or
delayed, on-duty flight attendants may be required to go off-duty
without the opportunity to earn the pay they expected, even if
they arrange to work a different flight.
Not only does the analysis in Hirst overlook the factual differ-
ences between wage schemes in other industries compared to
airlines, but the court missed an opportunity to carve out an
exception that would better suit the FLSA’s policy objectives in
applying the per-workweek standard. It is true that none of the
flight attendants in Hirst proved they earned less than an aver-
age of $7.25 per hour over the course of a given workweek.56
However, applying an hour-by-hour standard to the airline in-
dustry in particular would better support Congress’s endeavor
“to guarantee a minimum livelihood to the employees covered
by the Act.”57 The per-workweek standard only incentivizes air-
line companies to avoid paying flight attendants whenever possi-
ble and to make no accommodations for flight attendants who
lose an entire day’s worth of wages because their flight was
delayed or cancelled. Regardless of how much flight attendants
wind up earning on average—which for one SkyWest employee
only amounted to about $7.62 per hour58—that incentive com-
pletely undermines the FLSA’s intention “to protect certain
groups of the population from sub-standard wages . . . due to . . .
52 See OFFICE OF AEROSPACE MED., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DOT/FAA/AM-07/
21, FLIGHT ATTENDANT FATIGUE 13 (2007).
53 See, e.g., id. at 14–15.
54 Hirst, 2016 WL 2986978, at *2.
55 See FLIGHT ATTENDANT FATIGUE, supra note 52, at 3.
56 Hirst, 910 F.3d at 964.
57 Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960)).
58 Hirst, 910 F.3d at 964.
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unequal bargaining power.”59 Rather, it encourages collective
bargaining agreements among unions and the airline industry
that aim to pay just enough to avoid a serious federal violation,
while stripping flight attendants of any power to negotiate.60
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of minimum wage laws is to protect employees,
not to permit employers to adopt complex pay schemes that ulti-
mately accomplish the opposite. Congress made its objectives
clear in enacting the FLSA, but the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Hirst suggests that courts are not on the same page. It is true
that under the per-workweek standard, the Hirst flight attend-
ants failed to meet their burden. However, the Seventh Circuit’s
statement that there is “no reason to deviate from the Depart-
ment’s interpretation or the consensus of other federal appel-
late courts” flies in the face of both precedent and public
policy.61
Carving out an exception for the airline industry such that
flight attendants must be paid wages on an hourly instead of
weekly basis would accomplish the FLSA’s ultimate objectives
without overextending that standard to industries where average
weekly wages are more predictable. In addition, such a pay
scheme might actually alleviate the administrative burden
SkyWest complains of in relation to the flight attendants’ surviv-
ing state and local claims.62 With flight attendants constantly
crossing state lines, averaging weekly wages so as to comply with
a number of contradictory regulations does seems confusing.
However, paying flight attendants by the hour—by allowing
them to earn at least the minimum wage required by a particu-
lar state while working on the ground in that state—simplifies
the equation and guarantees compliance. Undoubtedly, the bur-
den of compliance should be placed on airlines, but in refusing
to impose an hour-by-hour wage scheme, the court missed an
opportunity to fulfill the FLSA’s purpose of giving bargaining
power back to employees.
59 Dove, 759 F.2d at 171 (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706
(1945)).
60 Cf. Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc., No. 15 C 02036, 2016 WL 2986978, at *3–4 (N.D.
Ill. May 24, 2016) (mem. op.).
61 See Hirst, 910 F.3d at 966.
62 See id. at 967.
